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Abstract
Many operators of cellphone networks now offer location-based services to their customers, whereby
an operator often outsources service provisioning to a third-party provider. Since a person’s location
could reveal sensitive information about the person, the operator must ensure that the service provider
processes location information about the operator’s customers in a privacy-preserving way. We propose
an architecture for location-based services based on Trusted Computing and Secure Logging. Trusted
Computing lets an operator query the conﬁguration of a location-based service. The operator will hand
over location information to the service only if the service is conﬁgured such that the service provider
cannot get access to location information using software-based attacks. This includes passive attacks,
where the provider monitors the composition or the timing of information ﬂowing into and out of its
service, and active attacks, where the provider modiﬁes or injects customer queries to the service. We in-
troduce several requirements that must be satisﬁed by a location-based service to defend against passive
attacks. Furthermore, we present Secure Logging, an auditing mechanism to defend against active at-
tacks. We present an implementation of our architecture and demonstrate its usefulness by building two
sample location-based services on top of it. The evaluation of our architecture shows that its processing
delay is hardly noticeable and that timing attacks are very unlikely to succeed.
1 Introduction
The ubiquity of cellphones has led many operators of cellphone networks to offer location-based services
to their customers, allowing these customers to map their current location, learn about interesting, nearby
places, locate other cellphone users, etc. Often, an operator outsources the provisioning of a location-based
service to a third-party provider. This outsourcing raises privacy concerns. Namely, the knowledge of a
person’s current or past locations could reveal sensitive information about the person’s interests, her health,
or her political preferences. Therefore, location information itself is sensitive, and the operator should
have assurance that the service provider deals with location information about the operator’s customers in a
privacy-preserving way, based on a given privacy policy. So far, this assurance has relied on a legal contract
between the operator and the provider. However, there has been no technical mechanism that lets an operator
verify whether the provider adheres to the privacy policy.
In this paper, we present an architecture for location-based services that provides such a mechanism.
Our architecture exploits Trusted Computing technologies [39] to let an operator gather information about
the conﬁguration of the platform that provides a location-based service. The operator hands over location
information to the platform only if the platform is conﬁgured to implement an outlined privacy policy. Here,
we are interested in the most constrained case where the policy states that the service platform must provide
its service such that the service provider cannot learn any location information.
Unfortunately, giving a comprehensive guarantee that covers all possible attempts by a service provider
to get access to location information is likely impossible. However, we can provide a weaker, but still useful
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be able to learn ﬁne-grained location information. This guarantee is superior to the non-technical guarantees
offered by current location-based services.
The usage of Trusted Computing technologies to inspect the conﬁguration of a service has already been
suggested [26, 36]. We address two additional challenges. First, the earlier work has not considered how
interactions of the service (e.g., a web server) with the backend infrastructure (e.g., a database) could lead to
information leaks. We show that, in a passive attack, the service provider could learn location information
by observing the composition or the timing of information ﬂowing into and out of the service platform.
Second, the earlier work includes an entire application, such as a web server consisting of thousands of
lines of code, in the computing base that is remotely inspected and subsequently trusted. The size of such
an application makes it likely that there is a vulnerability that a service provider could exploit. Therefore,
we do not want to include an entire location-based service in the trusted computing base. Instead, only the
part that needs direct access to location information (about 400 lines of code for our sample location-based
services) should be included, but not, for example, the access-control part. However, this approach enables
active attacks by a service provider, where the provider modiﬁes or injects queries to the service to learn
location information.
We make the following contributions:
 We build an architecture for the privacy-preserving processing of location information based on
Trusted Computing technologies.
 We give a set of requirements that need to be satisﬁed to defend against passive attacks by a service
provider.
 We introduce Secure Logging, an auditing mechanism that allows the retroactive detection of active
attacks by a service provider.
 We present an implementation and evaluation of our architecture. The evaluation shows that the
processing delay is hardly noticeable and that timing attacks are very unlikely to succeed.
This paper is an extended version of a paper that appeared in SecureComm 2008 [17]. The previous
paper misses the implementation (Section 7), security analysis (Section 8), and evaluation of our architec-
ture (Section 9). Furthermore, this paper presents a second sample location-based service built using our
architecture (Section 6.2) and discusses design decisions in more detail. We presented a preliminary version
of our architecture in a workshop paper [16], omitting the requirements needed to defend against passive
attacks, the protocol to validate satisfaction of these requirements, and Secure Logging.
In the rest of this paper, we ﬁrst present our system and threat models (Section 2). We then introduce
our architecture (Section 3). Next, we examine two of its components in more detail, the Trusted Module
(Section 4) and Secure Logging (Section 5). We then present two sample location-based services built using
this architecture (Section 6). Next, we describe our implementation (Section 7), followed by a security
analysis (Section 8) and an evaluation of our architecture (Section 9). Finally, we survey related work
(Section 10).
2 System and Threat Models
In our system model, the operator of a cellphone network and the provider of a location-based service are
separate entities. There are two infrastructures, the cellphone infrastructure, run by the operator of the
cellphone network, and the service infrastructure, run by the provider of the location-based service. The
cellphone infrastructure keeps track of the location of cellphones by observing which cell towers a cellphone
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for by the service infrastructure, typically as a consequence of a query by a cellphone user, the cellphone
infrastructure hands over location information, maybe in processed form, to the service infrastructure. Sev-
eral network operators in the UK, such as Vodafone or Orange, provide their customers’ location to service
providers, such as mapAmobile [6] or World-Tracker.Com [41]. Sprint and Bell Canada use WaveMarket’s
Family Finder [40] to provide location-based services. Lots of existing location privacy research is also
based on this system model [2, 7, 13, 24, 30, 32, 35].
There are two alternative system models. In the ﬁrst model, a cellphone user installs an operator-
independent client of a location-based application on her cellphone and has the cellphone interact directly
with the service infrastructure. An example is Google Maps Mobile [12]. Our approach can also be ap-
plied to this kind of system model. The only change is that the cellphone would have to take care of the
functionality that our approach assigns to the cellphone infrastructure. In the second model, cellphones in-
teract with each other directly to implement a distributed location-based service in a privacy-preserving
way or to achieve location privacy before accessing a centralized location-based service. Previous re-
search [11, 15, 42], including research by the author of this paper [42], has focused on this model.
Our threat model consists of a service provider learning a user’s ﬁne-grained location. The provider can
perform software-based attacks to extract this information from the service infrastructure, but no hardware-
based attacks or attacks based on physical user observation. (We take a closer look at hardware-based attacks
in Section 8.) These attacks are more expensive to perform. Also, defending against software-based attacks
still gives us better privacy than what existing location-based services provide. We also assume that a service
provider can observe the input and the output ﬂowing into and out of the service platform and modify or
inject queries sent to the platform. Finally, for efﬁciency reasons, we allow the service provider to learn a
user’s coarse-grained location. As it turns out, this happens only for some location-based services, not all of
them.
Our threat model allows a service provider to learn the identity of its users. For some services, such
as a service to locate interesting, nearby places, it is straightforward (ignoring billing challenges) to extend
our approach such that the service provider does not learn identity information; the cellphone infrastructure
simply anonymizes a query before sending it to the service infrastructure. For other services, such as a ser-
vice to locate nearby friends, where the service infrastructure needs information about friend relationships,
the solution is less obvious and topic of future research.
In addition to location and identity information, there are other types of information that might enable re-
identiﬁcation of a cellphone or of a wireless device in general, such as its MAC address [22], its transmission
characteristics [8], or its preferred SSIDs [33]. In our system model, the cellphone infrastructure acts as a
shield and makes sure that only location and identity information are forwarded to the service infrastructure.
In the rest of this paper, we assume that a user’s location corresponds to her cellphone’s location, and
we use both variants interchangeably.
3 Architecture Overview
Figure 1 shows our architecture for location-based services. In the cellphone infrastructure, we leave away
components not relevant in this paper, such as cell towers. The cellphone infrastructure consists of a set of
modules and communication links between these modules, where both the modules and the links are under
the control of the network operator. The same applies to the service infrastructure, which is under the control
of the service provider. Communication between modules belonging to different infrastructures takes place
over TLS with client and server authentication, which avoids snifﬁng, modiﬁcation and injection attacks by
outsiders.
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Figure 1: Architecture for location-based services. A cellphone sends a service query via the cellphone
infrastructure to the service infrastructure, which uses the Trusted Module for processing the query and
generating a response. Items in bold are encrypted (Response and Location).
3.1 Attestation Queries
Initially, the Attestation Module in the cellphone infrastructure queries the service infrastructure for the
conﬁgurationoftheTrustedModule(seeSection4.2fordetails). Itdoessobysendinganattestationqueryto
the Query Processor Module in the service infrastructure, whose task is to receive different kinds of queries,
to ensure that they are authorized, to process them if necessary, and to forward them to another module. In
the attestation case, the module forwards the query to the Trusted Module and returns the response (“quote”)
to the Attestation Module. If this module is satisﬁed with the reported conﬁguration (i.e., the conﬁguration
does not leak location information, see Section 4.1), it will give a symmetric key to the Trusted Module such
that the Query Processor Module cannot learn the key. Later, the cellphone infrastructure will use the key
for encrypting location information before handing the information over to the service infrastructure. This
way, the Trusted Module, but not the Query Processor Module (or the service provider), can decrypt and
learn location information.
3.2 Service and Location Queries
A cellphone user who wants to access a location-based service sends a service query to the cellphone in-
frastructure, namely, to the Forwarder Module. The Forwarder Module checks validity of the query based
on information in the User Database (e.g., did the user sign up to the location-based service?). For account-
ability reasons, the module then signs the query and sends it to the location-based service, in particular, to
the Query Processor Module. This module validates the signature of the query. For some services, such
as a service that checks whether a friend is nearby, the module must also ensure that the cellphone user
issuing the query is authorized to learn whether the queried person is nearby. Authorization information
is stored in the User Database. If the query is authorized, the Query Processor Module sends a location
query to the Locator Module in the cellphone infrastructure to retrieve the location information required for
processing the query, such as the location of the user’s and her friend’s cellphone. The Locator Module
returns location information only in encrypted form, namely, encrypted with the symmetric key introduced
in Section 3.1. Next, the Query Processor Module hands over the location information, the operator’s public
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The Trusted Module decrypts the location information. If necessary, as in the case of a query for inter-
esting, nearby places or for trafﬁc conditions, the module asks the Places Database via the Query Processor
Module for location-speciﬁc information, such as road maps or conditions, weather information, shops, or
restaurants. The Trusted Module then generates and signs its response and encrypts it with the operator’s
public key. To detect misbehaviour by the service provider, the module generates logging information,
which it hands over to the Logger Module (see Section 5). The Trusted Module gives its response to the
Query Processor Module, which forwards it to the Forwarder Module for decryption and signature checking.
To thwart trafﬁc-analysis attacks and to prevent unnecessary information from being sent to the cellphone,
this module might have to ﬁlter the response (see Section 6). Finally, the Forwarder Module forwards the
plaintext response to the cellphone.
3.3 Discussion
In our architecture, the Forwarder Module signs service queries and validates the signatures of responses. To
achieve end-to-end security, a cellphone, instead of the Forwarder Module, could perform this functionality.
Similarly, a cellphone could send attestation queries to the service infrastructure [29]. We do not adopt this
option because of deployment and usability concerns. First, we would require a key distribution architecture
and an infrastructure for disseminating information about approved platform conﬁgurations, which tend to
be difﬁcult to deploy. Second, users would have to install separate software on their cellphones, whereas
our architecture allows a user to contact a location-based service simply by sending an SMS message to the
cellphone infrastructure. Due to these concerns, we also have the operator send attestation queries to the
service infrastructure, instead of a cellphone (see Section 4.2 for a more detailed discussion).
Apart from end-to-end security, is there an incentive for cellphone users to install software and to gener-
ate a cryptographic key pair on cellphones? As it turns out, this can increase users’ privacy. In particular, the
cellphone can encrypt a query so that its contents remain hidden from the operator (e.g., the operator will not
learn what kind of interesting places the user is interested in). Similarly, the Trusted Module can encrypt its
response with the cellphone’s public key. However, hiding information from the operator is not part of our
threat model. Therefore, in the rest of this paper, we assume that the cryptographic operations mentioned
above are taken care of by the cellphone infrastructure and design our architecture accordingly. Along the
way, we will point out what kind of changes are necessary if a cellphones took care of these operations.
The responses generated by the Trusted Module are of a textual nature. If required, a cellphone can
process the response and generate a map, maybe in cooperation with the network operator or a third-party
map service. If the Trusted Module generated maps, we would have to be careful to avoid information leaks
(see Section 4.1).
4 Trusted Module
The Trusted Module is at the core of a location-based service and generates responses to service queries.
The module is deployed by the service provider and has access to location information. Nonetheless, the
service provider should not have access to this information. As stated in Section 2, we assume that the
provider can perform only software-based attacks to gain access to the information. We discuss the set of
requirements that need to be satisﬁed in order to defend against these attacks in Section 4.1. To ensure that
a platform actually fulﬁlls these requirements, a network operator uses the concept of remote attestation,
which we discuss in Section 4.2.
54.1 Avoiding Information Leaks
To infer a cellphone’s location, the service provider can mount various software-based attacks: First, the
provider can observe the input given to the Trusted Module. Second, the provider can observe the output
generated by the module. Third, the provider can observe the delay between input and output events. Fourth,
the provider can examine the memory used by the module. We now examine each of these attacks.
4.1.1 Input Attacks
TherearetwokindsofinputthataregiventotheTrustedModuleandthatcouldrevealacellphone’slocation.
First, there is actual location information. As discussed in Section 3.1, we require that location information
is encrypted before it is given to the Trusted Module. The service provider does not know the decryption key,
so the ciphertext is useless to the provider. Second, there is information about places (e.g., their locations),
as retrieved from the Places Database. By examining which records the Trusted Module requests from the
database, the provider could learn a user’s location. We could avoid this attack by including the entire
Places Database in the Trusted Module. However, this would drastically increase the size of the trusted
computing base, whereas our goal is to keep it as small as possible. As discussed in Section 10, Private
Information Retrieval (PIR) schemes also avoid this attack, but tend to be inefﬁcient. We use a compromise
that is more efﬁcient, but that lets the service provider learn some information about a user’s location. In
particular, we require the Trusted Module to cloak a user’s location before accessing the Places Database.
For example, when the user is at the train station, the module determines a larger area that includes the train
station, retrieves information about all the places in the cloaked area from the Places Database, and ﬁlters
information about places that are too far away when generating a response. This way, the service provider
can learn the area in which the person is, but not where exactly. Cloaking has been used extensively for
providing location privacy [4, 7, 11, 13, 15, 30].
4.1.2 Output Attacks
There are two kinds of output from the Trusted Module that could reveal location information: Responses
to service queries and log entries sent to the Logger Module. For the ﬁrst kind, we require that the Trusted
Module encrypts responses with the operator’s public key. For the second kind, we require that log entries
do not contain location information. Instead, they contain only information about service queries and about
the public key used for encrypting responses to these queries (see Section 5).
Encrypting the response to a service query is not always sufﬁcient to prevent the response from leaking
location information. We also require that there always is an output, regardless of a cellphone’s location. For
example, in a parent-child tracking service, the parent gets alerted when the child leaves a boundary area.
To implement this service, the Query Processor Module periodically invokes the Trusted Module, which
determines whether the current location is outside of the boundary area, where the boundary area is known
to the service provider. If the module returned a response only in the positive case, information would leak
to the Query Processor Module. Therefore, the Trusted Module always has to generate a response and the
content of the response must not leak any information. For example, the response could be the semantically
secure encryption of the value zero or one.
Furthermore, we require that the size of the output of the Trusted Module is determined by the user’s
cloaked location, not her precise location. For example, when the Trusted Module uses cloaked location
information to access the Places Database and ﬁlters the records received from the database, the response
generated by the module must not allow the provider to learn how many of the records got ﬁltered. See
Section 6.2 for an implementation of this scheme.
Finally, the Trusted Module could output location information using some other means, such as writing
the information to a ﬁle or to a display. We require that the Trusted Module does not generate output
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4.1.3 Timing Attacks
The service provider could measure the delay between giving a service query to the Trusted Module and
getting back a response. If different query outcomes resulted in different delays, measuring the delay could
leak location information. We require that the processing time of the Trusted Module is independent of the
query outcome. For example, for a service that checks for a nearby friend, the delay must be the same,
regardless whether the friend is nearby or not. To strictly enforce this property, we would have to guarantee
that the number of consumed CPU cycles is identical in either case, which is difﬁcult to enforce in practice.
Instead, in our sample location-based services, we ensure that the executed code path is identical in either
case and that the only difference is the outcome of one or multiple statements comparing variables. For
example, for a nearby-friends service, we have the module compute distance dist between two cellphones
and then determine the query response as
response = (dist <= nearby);
where nearby indicates the distance considered nearby. In a more complex example, the following state-
ments determine whether a cellphone at position (x,y) is within a rectangular area (x1,y1)-(x2,y2):
cond1 = (x >= x1);
cond2 = (x <= x2);
cond3 = (y >= y1);
cond4 = (y <= y2);
sum = cond1 + cond2 + cond3 + cond4;
response = (sum == 4);
Our implementation (see Section 7) ensures that a service provider cannot perform a timing attack di-
rectly on the machine on which the Trusted Module is deployed, so the provider would have to perform a
remote timing attack. Previous research [3] has shown that such attacks can be successfully mounted. How-
ever, the previous research relies on the existence of (remotely observable) timing differences of thousands
or millions of CPU cycles, depending on the expected error. In Section 9, we show that the observed timing
differences for the code examples shown above are orders of magnitudes smaller than what is required for a
successful timing attack.
4.1.4 Memory Attacks
The service provider might try to extract location information or the symmetric decryption key from the
memory used by the Trusted Module. We require that the provider cannot access this memory using
software-based mechanisms. In our sample location-based services, we deploy the Trusted Module on a
dedicated machine and conﬁgure the machine such that the provider cannot log in to it (see Section 7).
4.2 Remote Attestation
In Section 4.1, we came up with a set of requirements that the Trusted Module must satisfy to prevent
location information from leaking. Of course, the developer of the Trusted Module, who could be identical
with the service provider, might not actually address these requirements in the implementation. To ensure
that our requirements are being satisﬁed, we use remote attestation.
Remoteattestationisafeatureproposedbythe[39](TCG).Withthehelpofaninexpensivechip(inTCG
terminology, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM)) soldered to the motherboard of a computer, this feature
allows an entity to remotely gather information about the code running on this computer. Starting at boot
7AM ! TM: nonce
TM: generate key pair (PublicTransfer,
PrivateTransfer), measure PublicTransfer in TPM,
hand over nonce to TPM, retrieve quote
TM ! AM: measurement list ML, SPrivateAIK(noncejjdigest(ML)), PublicTransfer
AM: check quote signature, re-compute and approve ML, abort if failure
AM ! TM: EPublicTransfer(SymmetricKey)
TM: retrieve SymmetricKey, erase PrivateTransfer
Table 1: Transfer protocol for symmetric key. AM denotes the Attestation Module and TM the Trusted
Module. SFoo() is a signing operation with key Foo, EBar() an encryption operation with key Bar.
time, each piece of running code (including BIOS code) gathers information about the next piece of code
to be loaded and executed and stores this information in the TPM. This process is called a measurement.
The TPM guarantees that measurements cannot be reverted (using software-based mechanisms). Therefore,
we end up with a chain of measurements, rooted at the static root of trust, which typically is part of the
computer’s BIOS. If the entity asking a remote computer to perform a remote attestation trusts this root,
the TPM, and each piece of loaded code, the entity can retrieve the measurement list from the TPM and
infer what code is loaded and executed on the computer. In practice, a TPM does not store a measurement
list, only a cryptographic digest, and the actual list is kept by the measuring code (see Sailer et al. [36] for
details). A remote attestation returns the list and its digest, signed by the TPM, to the querying entity. A
signed digest is called a quote.
Going back to the Trusted Module, the network operator exploits remote attestation to retrieve the mea-
surement list from the module, which will allow the operator to learn the conﬁguration of the module. The
operator compares the received list to a list of approved measurements. Software is in an approved state if it
is in a given state (e.g., a particular binary with a set of conﬁguration parameters), as in the case of a kernel,
or if it satisﬁes the requirements discussed in Section 4.1, as in the case of a component implementing a
particular location-based service. To build the list of approved measurements, the operator must have had
access to the software (including source code, binaries, and compiler, see Section 7 for details) beforehand
for inspection purposes. If the operator can validate the received list of measurements, the operator will
hand over the symmetric key that allows decryption of location information to the Trusted Module.
We show the protocol for this transfer in Table 1; it is partially based on earlier work [28, 36]. We
assume that the conﬁguration of the Trusted Module has been measured in the TPM as part of the boot
process. When asking for a remote attestation, the Attestation Module generates a nonce and sends it to the
Trusted Module, which generates an asymmetric key pair. The public key, PublicTransfer, will be given
to the Attestation Module, which will employ it to transfer the symmetric key used for encrypting location
information to the Trusted Module. By measuring PublicTransfer in the TPM, the Trusted Module guaran-
tees to the Attestation Module that the key pair was created by the Trusted Module and that the private key,
PrivateTransfer, is kept within the module and will be erased from memory after the transfer, as a defense
against cold-boot attacks [14]. (We do not use the TPM’s sealing option [39] for storing PrivateTransfer
across attestation requests, since this option only reduces, but does not completely eliminate the window of
vulnerability.)
TheTrustedModulehandsoverthenoncereceivedfromtheAttestationModuletotheTPMandrequests
a quote. The returned quote includes the nonce and is signed with a private key embedded in the TPM (in
TCG terminology, the private key of the Attestation Identity Key (AIK) pair). The Attestation Module
knows the corresponding public key. The Trusted Module returns the quote, the measurement list, and
PublicTransfer to the Attestation Module, which recomputes the measurement list based on the expected
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since this value depends on the order in which the OS running on the Trusted Module’s computer loads
kernel modules and applications, which can differ slightly across reboots. If there are any values in the
measurement list that are unknown to the Attestation Module, the module aborts the protocol. Else, the
AttestationModuleusesPublicTransfer toencryptthesymmetrickeyandsendstheciphertexttotheTrusted
Module. In addition to PublicTransfer, the Trusted Module also transfers the public key for the signing key
that it will use for signing responses to service queries (not shown).
The described protocol is executed whenever the platform of the Trusted Module is rebooted. An alter-
native is to execute the protocol only once and to use the TPM’s sealing option for storing the symmetric
key across reboots. Sealing allows encryption of the symmetric key such that it can be decrypted only when
the Trusted Module is in the same conﬁguration as at sealing time. This makes it possible to store the sealed
key in permanent storage. However, as mentioned above, the conﬁguration of the Trusted Module could
change after a reboot, which means that the unsealing operation would fail.
Another alternative is to have a cellphone ask the Trusted Module for a quote and validate the returned
measurement list, after which the cellphone would provide a (user-speciﬁc) decryption key for location
information to the Trusted Module. Previous research [9, 29] has demonstrated the feasibility of having
a cellphone validate measurement lists. However, the approach raises several deployment and usability
challenges. First, users would have to install software on their cellphones, which they do not have to in our
approach. Second, we cannot expect users to come up with an expected conﬁguration of the Trusted Module,
so we would need a trusted third party. This includes a mechanism for the third party to notify cellphones
of changes in the conﬁguration, as in the case of software updates. Third, the network operator already
has access to location information and likely has a contract with the service provider that lets the provider
offer location-based services on behalf of the network operator. In this setup, having the operator perform
remote attestation seems the logical approach, instead of getting users involved and potentially confused.
Fourth, if a cellphone cannot validate the measurement list, automatically denying the user from accessing
the service could be wrong, as in the case of an emergency. Designing an appropriate user dialog is hard,
since users tend to click away messages pointing out potential security problems, as experienced for expired
or mismatched SSL certiﬁcates.
An operator might repeat remote attestation periodically (e.g., in an attempt to detect time-of-check,
time-of-use(TOCTOU)attacks). Here, theTrustedModulealsohastohandoverpreviouslyusedPublicTransfer
so that the Attestation Module can recompute the measurement list.
5 Secure Logging
The Trusted Module invokes the Logger Module to keep a log of its actions. These actions are requested
by the Query Processor Module. With the help of the log, we can detect wrongly requested actions, that
is, misbehaviour by the Query Processor Module (i.e., the service provider). For example, this module
is expected to run access control for some location-based services, such as ensuring that only authorized
people can track a person. If the module did not run access control and allowed, for example, the service
provider to track the person, a corresponding log entry would make the person aware of this violation, and
she would alert the network operator.
An alternative approach is to run access control in the Trusted Module. However, we would like to keep
this module as simple as possible, which decreases the likelihood of a vulnerability in the module and also
makes it easier for an operator to check the module’s correctness. Furthermore, a service provider could be
reluctant to implement the entire service within the Trusted Module, since part of this implementation might
be proprietary, and the provider does not want to reveal it to an operator for inspection.
Our goal is to log each access to a person’s location such that log entries cannot be tampered with or
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TPM Software
0 0 AIK-certiﬁed signature veriﬁcation key signature
0 1 user id query digest public key digest signature
0 2 user id query digest public key digest signature
0 3 special log entry signature
1 0 AIK-certiﬁed signature veriﬁcation key signature
1 1 user id query digest public key digest signature
1 2 special log entry signature
2 0 AIK-certiﬁed signature veriﬁcation key signature
2 1 user id query digest public key digest signature
Table 2: Log format. A signature covers the counter and the log entry.
removed. For each access to a person’s location, logging should enable this person to learn 1) the service
query that triggered this access and 2) the public key that was used for encrypting the response to this query.
In Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we discuss how we support these requirements. In Section 5.3, we show how we
use the logged information to detect misbehaviour.
5.1 Logged Information
A logentry is generatedby the TrustedModule whenever itaccesses somebody’s location. Anentry contains
an identiﬁer unique for the user whose location was accessed, a cryptographic digest of the service query that
triggered this access, and a cryptographic digest of the public key used for encrypting the module’s response
(see Table 2). It is possible to log additional information, such as the accessed location information (in
encrypted form) or the response to a query, but this is not required by our threat model.
The user identiﬁer will be used during log checking to learn whose location information was accessed.
This identiﬁer is communicated to the Trusted Module by the Locator Module, together with the (encrypted)
location information. A message authentication code protects their integrity.
The query digest is computed by the Query Processor Module and given to the Trusted Module. The
Query Processor Module needs to store the corresponding service query.
The Query Processor Module also hands over the operator’s public key to the Trusted Module so that
the module can encrypt the response to a query. A malicious Query Processor Module could hand over its
own public key, which would allow it to decrypt the response. Therefore, the Trusted Module, not the Query
Processor Module, computes the digest of the received public key to be included in the log entry. We let
the Query Processor Module compute the digest of a (signed) query because the module gains no advantage
from cheating here.
A single query can result in multiple log entries. For example, in a nearby-friends service, if Alice tries
to locate Bob, the Trusted Module logs accesses to both Alice and Bob’s location, each entry containing
a digest of Alice’s query. The operator inserts a nonce into a query to detect replay attacks by the Query
Processor Module (e.g., in a timing attack).
5.2 Tampering and Removal Attacks
To protect log entries against tampering, the Trusted Module signs each entry before handing it over to the
Logger Module. The Trusted Module logs the public key for the signing key in certiﬁed form whenever
the module is initialized. The certiﬁcate is signed with the TPM’s AIK private key. We cannot use this
10key directly for signing a log entry, since it can be used only for signing keys. Also, private-key operations
executed by the TPM are expensive (844 ms for a signature), so we avoid them during the processing of a
service query.
To protect log entries against their removal, the Trusted Module includes the current value of a mono-
tonically increasing counter in each entry and increases this counter after generating an entry. Here, the
module needs to be able to reliably determine the value of this counter in case of a restart of the module.
A possible approach is to use a TPM v1.2 monotonic counter, which is a counter within the TPM that can
never be decreased. A problem with such a counter is that a TPM might support increases only once ev-
ery ﬁve seconds to avoid burnouts. To increase logging frequency, we divide time into epochs. An epoch
corresponds to the time between the initialization of the Trusted Module and its shut down. We use a TPM
v1.2 monotonic counter to denote the current epoch and a software-based monotonic counter to denote time
within an epoch. The Trusted Module includes the current values of both counters in a log entry. The
module increases the TPM v1.2 monotonic counter only during module initialization. At the same time, the
software-based counter is set to zero. This counter is increased after generating a log entry, which results in
a global order among the log entries.
The above algorithm ensures that, given a log entry, we can detect removal of earlier log entries that have
the same TPM v1.2 monotonic counter value. However, the algorithm does not protect against the removal
of more recent log entries (i.e., with larger software-based or TPM counter values) or against the removal
of log entries with lower TPM v1.2 monotonic counter values. For example, given a log entry with a TPM
v1.2 monotonic counter value of 5, all we can say is there are must be log entries with TPM v1.2 monotonic
counter values of 0, 1,..., 4, but not how many of each kind. There could also be log entries with TPM v1.2
monotonic counter values of 6, 7,... Let us discuss how we address these two attacks.
For the ﬁrst attack, we want to ensure to a cellphone user that the last log entry seen by her when
checking the log is the most recent log entry generated by the Trusted Module for an access to her location
information (or close to the most recent one, since new entries can be added while the user is checking log
entries). We can satisfy this condition by making the user send a query that accesses her location information
to the location-based service before the user checks her log entries. This way, the Trusted Module will create
a new log entry, and the user can verify whether there is an entry for her query in the log. If so, the log is up
to date.
The second attack can be avoided by having the Trusted Module generate a special log entry whenever
the service provider makes the module shut down. This way, an increase in the value of the TPM v1.2
monotonic counter, as observed in the log, is always preceded by such a special entry, and missing log
entries can be detected (see Table 2). The absence of a special entry does not necessarily imply malicious
behaviour. For instance, the Trusted Module could have crashed or there might have been a power outage,
which prevented the module from creating the special entry. However, an operator should get suspicious
if there are many missing special log entries. Then, either the location-based service is unreliable or there
is widespread removal of log entries. Neither of the options is in the operator’s interest, and the operator
should stop using the service.
5.3 Log Validation
Consistent with the architecture described in Section 3, we assume that the operator will take care of the
cryptographic operations required for log validation. If a log entry is considered valid, the operator will
forward the query that triggered access to a particular user’s location to this user for inspection. In more
detail, log validation consists of the following steps:
Having a user review log entries in the context of location-based services has been suggested in previous
work (e.g., by Prabaker et al. [34]). There, the assumption is that a location-based service is trustworthy, and
the goal of reviewing is to allow the user to validate her access policy. Here, reviewing is done for validating
11both the access policy and conformance of the service provider.
1. The user issues a service query, where processing of the query requires access to her location infor-
mation. This will create a log entry.
2. The operator downloads the log (i.e., the entries added since the previous validation) from the service
platform. The operator checks the digital signature of each entry and ensures that the counter values
are monotonically increasing and complete.
3. The operator determines the log entries relevant to the user based on the user identiﬁer and asks the
service provider for the corresponding service queries. The operator ensures that the digests of the
received queries match the logged digests and that the queries are properly formed and fresh. The
operator also checks whether the query issued in step 1) is in the log.
4. The operator ensures that the logged digests of the public key match the digest of the public key of
the operator. If so, the query is forwarded to the user.
5. The user inspects the received queries. If she detects an unauthorized query, she will alert the operator.
The above protocol differs slightly in case a user’s cellphone is set up to encrypt service queries so that
their contents remain hidden from the network operator. Here, upon log checking, the Query Processor
Module encrypts a query with the cellphone’s public key before giving it to the operator. The operator
forwards the encrypted query and the log entry to the cellphone, which decrypts the query and ensures
that its digest matches the digest in the log entry and that the public key used for encrypting the response
corresponds to the cellphone’s public key.
6 Sample Location-Based Services
Let us now discuss how we build two sample location-based services in our architecture.
6.1 Nearby Friends
This service allows a user to learn whether a friend of hers is nearby. The user sends a query listing the
name of the friend to the Forwarder Module, which signs the query, adds the (encrypted) location of the
user’s cellphone, and forwards it to the Query Processor Module. (Including the location with a query is
an optimization to the architecture discussed in Section 3.2.) The Query Processor Module retrieves the
friend’s policy from the User Database and ensures that the friend has granted access to the user. If so, the
module requests the location of the friend’s cellphone from the Locator Module. Next, it hands the two
locations and the operator’s public key over to the Trusted Module.
The Trusted Module uses the symmetric key received during attestation to decrypt the two locations and
determines whether they are nearby. Depending on the result, it signs a byte of value either zero or one with
its private key, encrypts everything with the operator’s public key, and returns the ciphertext to the Query
Processor Module, which sends it to the Forwarder Module. This module decrypts the ciphertext and sends
the result to the cellphone. The Trusted Module also logs two accesses to the user’s and her friend’s location.
6.2 Interesting Places
This service returns interesting places (e.g., restaurants) close to the user’s current location. Let us assume
that the owner of the cellphone is willing to install separate software on her cellphone, which signs and
encrypts queries and checks and decrypts responses to achieve end-to-end security. This approach also
12results in additional user privacy, since it shields information from the network operator. (However, this is
not required by our threat model.)
The cellphone sends a signed and encrypted query indicating what kind of places the user is interested in
to the Forwarder Module. The query is encrypted so that the network operator cannot learn the user’s inter-
ests. The module adds the cellphone’s location and forwards the query to the Query Processor Module. This
module decrypts the query and hands over the type of places, the cellphone’s location, and the cellphone’s
public key, stored in the User Database, to the Trusted Module. The module decrypts and cloaks the location
and retrieves the locations of a set of relevant places within the cloaked area from the Places Database. Next,
the Trusted Module allocates a chunk of memory, one bit for each received place. The module looks at each
place, decides whether it is close enough to the cellphone’s actual location, and sets the corresponding bit
in the chunk to either zero or one. Then it encrypts the entire chunk of memory with the operator’s public
key, and it encrypts the location of each place separately with the cellphone’s public key. All the ciphertexts
are sent to the Query Processor Module and forwarded to the Forwarder Module. This approach guarantees
that the Trusted Module executes the same code path and generates the same amount of output, regardless
of which and how many places are relevant.
The Forwarder Module ﬁlters the responses. It decrypts the chunk of memory indicating which of the
(encrypted) places are relevant and forwards only the relevant ones to the cellphone, which decrypts them.
Again, by encrypting the places, we prevent the network operator from learning the user’s interests. The
ﬁltering done by the Forwarder Module ensures that no unnecessary trafﬁc is sent to the cellphone, for which
the user might get charged.
7 Implementation
We implemented our architecture and the nearby-friends and the interesting-places services in C on Linux.
We use 2048 bit RSA keys for public-key cryptography, AES in CBC mode with 256 bit keys for symmetric-
key cryptography, and HMAC for message authentication codes. The non-TPM-based cryptographic oper-
ations exploit OpenSSL.
Our implementation of the Trusted Module consists of three parts. On the hardware side, there is a
Lenovo T60 ThinkPad with an Intel Core Duo processor (1.83 GHz), which comes with an Atmel TPM
v1.2. On the software side, the OS is Ubuntu Linux 2.6.20.3, extended with IBM Research’s Integrity
Measurement Architecture (IMA) patch [20]. This patch provides support for remote attestation by enabling
the kernel to measure kernel modules and applications, as well as applications to measure ﬁles. Furthermore,
we built two application-layer components that interact with the Query Processor and the Logger Modules.
These “TM components”, one for each location-based service, use TrouSerS 0.3.0 [19] for application-layer
communication with the TPM. Each component includes about 600 lines of attestation code. The component
for the nearby-friends service consists of an additional 350 lines of code that process location information
(420 lines of code in case of the interesting-places service).
As mentioned in Section 4.1, we have to avoid that the Trusted Module leaks location information to
the service provider. To prevent leaks to other applications running on the same computer, maybe via side
channels, the Trusted Module is the only application that runs on the ThinkPad. Any other applications
should not be approved during remote attestation. In the future, more advanced features that are becoming
available in x86 processors will make it easier to ensure that applications running on the same machine as
the Trusted Module will not interfere with the module [28].
An advantage of having a separate machine for the Trusted Module is that we do not have to worry
about other users or processes that (maybe legitimately) want to use this machine. Instead, we can simply
lock them out, and we do not allow any user (including superuser) logins. This way, we do not have to
worry about users gaining superuser rights, users examining the running TM components, or limiting the
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Furthermore, if users are not able to log in, timing and TOCTOU attacks (see Section 8) become more
difﬁcult.
There are multiple ways to forbid logins. An option that requires only a small change (which is impor-
tant, see below) is to disable them in /etc/shadow. In order to manage the Trusted Module, we boot an OS
that resides in a different disk partition. To detect attacks on the /etc/shadow, the TM component measures
this ﬁle. Assume a malicious provider changes the ﬁle and boots the platform. If an operator asks for a
remote attestation, /etc/shadow will not look to the operator as expected. The superuser could try to reverse
the changes to /etc/shadow by trying to log in to the machine before the TM component is started. However,
the login (and the ﬁxes to /etc/shadow) will invoke applications that are not approved by the operator (e.g.,
/bin/login). If the superuser changes the init application (which is started by the kernel) such that it does
not run these applications, these changes will also show up in the measurement list. The same is going to
happen when the TM component is modiﬁed to measure a fake shadow ﬁle.
As an additional precaution, we run only the minimal number of processes, in addition to the TM
component, on the machine (e.g., no SSH daemon). An operator should abort remote attestation if additional
processes show up in the measurement list. In total, there are about 50 processes and threads, most of them
kernel level. We use Ubuntu’s default kernel, conﬁguration, and development tools for compiling the kernel
and the TM components. It is possible to trim down the kernel conﬁguration so that the number of processes
and threads gets even smaller. However, this trimming down can be dangerous. In particular, when it is
done by the service provider, the provider might try to sneak information leaks into the kernel that are
difﬁcult to detect by the network operator. Similarly, when using a non-standard compiler for compiling
a TM component, the service provider could compromise the binary. By using software that is not under
the control of the provider, we avoid these attacks and make it easier for the network operator to come up
with a list of approved software. Similarly, keeping the amount of software that is run on the machine small
simpliﬁes maintenance of this list. Furthermore, with the help of property-based attestation [25], an operator
can delegate maintenance to a trusted third party.
Finally, we turn off suspend and disable swapping to ensure that memory never gets written to disk. Our
machine has ample memory (2 GB) and no need for swapping.
8 Security Analysis
OurimplementationoftheTrustedModuleissusceptibletotime-of-check, time-of-use(TOCTOU),hardware-
based attacks, and cold-boot attacks.
In a TOCTOU attack, the attacker manages to change the conﬁguration of the Trusted Module after
remote attestation has taken place. This requires the attacker to have access to the Trusted Module and the
presence of an exploitable vulnerability, such as a buffer overﬂow. In our implementation, we make this
attack hard by keeping the TM component small and by giving the service provider neither local nor remote
login access to the platform of the Trusted Module.
TPMs are not designed to withstand hardware-based attacks. Whereas hardware-based attacks are out-
side our threat model, recent work [23] has demonstrated their feasibility. There are three ways to address
these attacks: First, the TCG deﬁnes a special kind of credential, the Platform Credential, that contains
information about the hardware conﬁguration of a platform. This credential can be retrieved during remote
attestation, so a network operator can abort if the service provider uses a vulnerable platform. Second, recent
extensions to x86 processors have made it possible to get rid of the static root of trust and to use a dynamic
root of trust, which makes hardware-based attacks more difﬁcult [23]. However, this approach might make
timing attacks easier. Moreover, it would have high performance overhead. For each query, the Trusted
Module would have to perform an unsealing operation, which takes hundreds of milliseconds with current
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coprocessor, such as the IBM 4764 [18]. However, these coprocessors tend to be more expensive and slower
than current server hardware and can have usability problems [26]. Even if we used such a coprocessor, we
would still have to avoid the information leaks discussed in Section 4.1 and support Secure Logging.
In a cold-boot attack [14], an attacker manages to extract the symmetric key used for decrypting location
information from the physical memory of the Trusted Module. In our architecture, we use a symmetric key
only once for decrypting encrypted location information and then replace it with a fresh key, based on a
cryptographic hash of the old key. The private key used for transferring the initial symmetric key to the
Trusted Module is erased immediately after the transfer. These precautions give us perfect forward secrecy.
Perfect backward secrecy is less of a concern. An attacker would have to steal the current symmetric key, the
TLS private key, and other state information from the physical memory and set up a fake Trusted Module,
without the network operator noticing that the original Trusted Module has been powered off. To make this
attack even harder, the Trusted Module can periodically send signed, timestamped keep-alive messages to
the network operator. If these messages are delayed by more than a threshold, the network operator stops
sending location information to the module and requests its reboot, resulting in a new attestation operation.
9 Evaluation
In this section, we study the processing times of service queries and the feasibility of timing attacks.
9.1 Query Processing Times
We have two goals when studying the processing times of service queries. First, we want to measure
overallresponse timesforthe nearby-friends andtheinteresting-places services. Second, wewant toidentify
bottlenecks. We do not study the cost of remote attestation; this has been done before [36], and it occurs
during initialization of the Trusted Module, so it is not part of the critical path.
We use the following setup to evaluate our architecture: We deploy the Trusted Module as discussed in
Section 7. For simplicity reasons, we put all the other modules and the two databases on a single desktop
machine with an Intel Pentium 4 (3 GHz) processor. The communication between the desktop machine and
the Trusted Module runs over a wired network. For the nearby-friends service, the user and her friend each
have a BlackBerry 8820 device, which has WiFi and GPS. Both devices periodically inform the network
operator of their location; the user also transmits her location when issuing a service query. The devices
communicate over WiFi. For the interesting-places service, we do not use a BlackBerry device, instead
we use a slow laptop (a ThinkPad T43 with a 2 GHz Intel Pentium M processor) to approximate the ca-
pabilities of a modern smartphone. The laptop reports the location of its access point as its location to the
network operator. While the BlackBerry devices are able to perform asymmetric cryptographic operations
efﬁciently, as required by the interesting-places service, reporting these measurements raises licensing issues
with Certicom, the provider of these operations.
For both the nearby-friends and the interesting-places service, we execute ten service queries. In case of
the second service, we have the Places Database return 100 places to the Trusted Module, which then marks
ten of them as valid. Our results are shown in Table 3, we report overall response time and the processing
times of a service query and its response by the various modules. We report ’n/a’ when a cost is found to be
negligible. For the nearby-friends service, the average response time is about 107 ms. We ﬁnd that most of
the cost is due to performing private-key operations (signing and decrypting for Forwarder Module, signing
for Trusted Module), where a single operation takes about 19 ms on the desktop machine and 35 ms on the
T60 ThinkPad. The delay caused by communicating over WiFi instead of issuing a service query directly
on the desktop machine is in the order of 15 ms.
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Friends [ms] Places [ms]
Cellphone (query) n/a 62 (9)
Forwarder Module (query) 24 (5) n/a
Query Processor Module (query) n/a 19 (1)
Trusted Module 37 (1) 80 (2)
Query Processor Module (response) n/a n/a
Forwarder Module (response) 21 (2) 19 (1)
Cellphone (response) n/a 44 (0)
Overall response time 107 (3) 213 (3)
Table 3: Query processing times. We present mean and standard deviation (in parentheses).
Machine Code example 1 Code example 2
Negative Positive Negative Positive
Desktop 484 (4) 555 (1) 4,008 (14) 4,080 (15)
Laptop 517 (1) 561 (0) 4,980 (9) 5,034 (8)
Table 4: Cycle counts for code examples in Section 4.1.3. We present mean and standard deviation (in
parentheses).
For the interesting-places services, the response time increases to about 213 ms. Here, the T43 ThinkPad
signs the service query and decrypts the response. As expected, the T43 ThinkPad is slower than the other
two computers. The Forwarder Module no longer needs to sign the service query, but it still needs to decrypt
the response for ﬁltering purposes. The processing times of the Trusted Module and of the Query Processor
Module increase, which is due to the cost of receiving records from the Places Database and processing
them. Note that the overall response time is shorter than the individual processing times, because some of
the operations are executed in parallel. (E.g., the laptop can asymmetrically decrypt the symmetric key that
was used for encrypting the places while the Forwarder Module is still ﬁltering them.)
In summary, the measurements show that the processing delay of our architecture is hardly noticeable
by a user. If the cost of the asymmetric cryptographic operations is a concern, downgrading to 1024 bit RSA
keys will still provide adequate security in the medium term.
9.2 Timing Attacks
In the next experiment, we study the feasibility of timing attacks, as explained in Section 4.1.3. Our imple-
mentation does not allow a service provider to take measurements directly on the platform of the Trusted
Module, instead the provider has to perform a remote timing attack, whose feasibility has been demonstrated
by Brumley and Boneh [3].
We use the “rdtsc” instruction to retrieve the current value of the CPU cycle counter before and after
executing a piece of code. We precede each “rdtsc” instruction with a “cpuid” instruction, which serializes
the processor and avoids interference from out-of-order execution. Therefore, the absolute running time
includes the execution time for one “cpuid” instruction, but we care only about relative running time.
We perform our measurements on the T60 ThinkPad and the desktop machine. We run four experiments
on each machine, an experiment is repeated 100 times. In the ﬁrst two experiments, we measure the running
time of the single line of code required for determining whether a friend is nearby, as shown in Section 4.1.3.
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that the answer is positive. The third and fourth experiments consist of 100 iterations of the second example
show in Section 4.1.3. For example, for the interesting-places service, this code could be used to infer which
of 100 places returned from the Places Database are in a user’s area of interest. In the third experiment, the
answer is negative for all the places, in the fourth one, it is always positive, which is a worst-case scenario.
We present our results in Table 4.
From our results, we conclude that there is a statistically signiﬁcant difference between the execution
times of the positive and the negative case for both code examples. However, the difference is at most in the
order of 80 cycles, which is multiple orders of magnitudes smaller than the differences required by Brumley
and Boneh for a successful remote timing attack (thousands or millions, depending on the expected error).
Furthermore, as shown in Table 3, the standard deviation of the processing time for the Trusted Module is
in the order of milliseconds, so the differences in the cycle counts disappear in this noise. Finally, Secure
Logging prevents a service provider from actively mounting a timing attack. Instead, the provider has to
passively observe service queries and their responses, which limits the number of available measurements.
In summary, our measurements show that remote timing attacks are very unlikely to be successful.
10 Related Work
Researchinlocationprivacy hasstudiedhowtoaddressthe apparent contradiction, where, onthe onehand, a
location-based service needs access to location information to be useful, but, on the other hand, it should not
have this access because of privacy concerns. A popular approach is location cloaking [4, 7, 11, 13, 15, 30],
where only coarse-grained, less intrusive location information is given to a location-based service. Other
work [2, 32] has suggested the usage of pseudonyms to keep a person’s identity hidden from a service.
However, some location-based services do require ﬁne-grained location information or information about
the person’s identity, else service quality could suffer [4]. Services that alert parents when their child leaves
a boundary area or that alert people of nearby friends fall into this category. Our architecture supports such
services.
K¨ olsch et al. [24] also examine location privacy in a setup where the network operator and the service
provider are different entities. They introduce a trusted third party that tracks users and that alerts the
service provider when the user is in a particular area. The authors do not present an implementation of their
concept, in particular, they do not discuss who acts as this third party. Our Trusted Module, as introduced in
Section 3, can be looked at as such a third party. Apart from having a proof-of-concept implementation, our
architecture has the additional advantage that it can exploit identity information and ﬁne-grained location
information, which increases service quality, whereas the previous work relies on coarse-grained location
information and pseudonyms. Ravi et al. [35] have a service provider migrate the code that implements a
location-based service to a network operator. The operator uses information ﬂow control to ensure that the
code does not leak a cellphone’s ﬁne-grained location to the provider. This approach is targeted at services
that exploit aggregate location information and does not support services that require ﬁne-grained location,
as supported by our solution.
The usage of Trusted Computing or similar technologies for privacy protection has been proposed in
earlier work. Molnar et al. [31] give a secret required for reading RFID tags to a reader only if the reader
passes a remote conﬁguration check. There is no implementation of this idea and no discussion of how the
operator of a reader might indirectly gain access to data read by the reader. Iliev and Smith [21] deploy
a tamperproof coprocessor at a server and use it for implementing a Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
scheme [5], which allows database accesses without the owner of the database learning which records are
being accessed. We could use PIR to let a cellphone retrieve information about interesting places close to
its location without the service provider operating the database learning the location. However, Iliev and
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of (single-server) PIR schemes that do not require a tamperproof coprocessor, Sion and Carbunar [38] show
that these schemes are less time-efﬁcient than simply transferring the entire database. Ghinita et al. [10]
argue that the latter approach is not in the interest of a database owner and study the performance of a single-
server, computational PIR scheme in the context of an interesting-places service. In many of the scenarios
studied by the authors, the security of the PIR scheme relies on the difﬁculty of factoring a modulus of length
768 bits, which is far below the minimum length of 1024 bits recommended by NIST [1]. For a modulus
of length 1024 bits, the authors ﬁnd that each query requires at least ten seconds of server processing time.
Moreover, the response to a query lets a client client learn
p
n out of n interesting places stored in the
database, so for the maximum value of n studied by the authors, n = 100;000, a client can learn the entire
database by asking only 317 queries. In summary, our compromise, as explained in Section 4.1.1, is more
efﬁcient and leaks no unnecessary information to a client, but reveals coarse-grained location information to
the service provider.
Previous research has explored the usage of Trusted Computing technologies to validate the conﬁgura-
tion of a remote server [26, 27, 28, 36]. Here, a client ensures that the server (e.g., a web or SSH server)
corresponds to an approved version, that it has not been tampered with, or that it does not leak a secret
(e.g., a password). Our problem is harder because of the presence of the service provider, who can passively
and actively intercept queries/responses ﬂowing into/out of the service platform and measure their timing,
which might leak location information (see Section 4.1). Moreover, to limit the danger of an exploitable vul-
nerability being present in the conﬁguration trusted by the client, we do not include an entire server in the
validated conﬁguration, as opposed to Marchesini et al. [26] and Sailer et al. [36], only the part that directly
deals with location information. McCune et al. [27, 28] study how to reduce this trusted computing base by
exploiting a dynamic root of trust, but this solution currently has high per-query overhead (see Section 8).
Finally, we give an explicit set of requirements that need to be satisﬁed in order for a particular version of
software getting approval, which is a topic that has been neglected in previous work.
In terms of Secure Logging, Schneier and Kelsey [37] look at logging in the presence of an attacker.
However, their threat model is different from ours. They are concerned about an attacker breaking into a
machine, like a service provider managing to subvert our architecture, and modifying existing log entries.
This is not a threat that we study in this paper, so the previous research is orthogonal to ours. A problem
that we, but not the previous work, study is how to securely initialize the logging process upon a reboot of
the service platform.
11 Conclusions and Future Work
We have demonstrated that it is possible to build efﬁcient location-based services for which the service
provider does not become aware of users’ ﬁne-grained location. In addition to keeping location information
away from a service provider by encrypting it, we have also addressed several other passive and active
attacks that a service provider might perform to gain access to this information.
Future work involves studying solutions based on a dynamic root of trust and applying our approach to
protect the privacy of personal information other than location information, not necessarily only in location-
based services.
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